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ABSTRACT 
Formulating data science problems is an uncertain and 
difficult process. It requires various forms of discretionary 
work to translate high-level objectives or strategic goals into 
tractable problems, necessitating, among other things, the 
identification of appropriate target variables and proxies. 
While these choices are rarely self-evident, normative 
assessments of data science projects often take them for 
granted, even though different translations can raise 
profoundly different ethical concerns. Whether we consider a 
data science project fair often has as much to do with the 
formulation of the problem as any property of the resulting 
model. Building on six months of ethnographic fieldwork with 
a corporate data science team—and channeling ideas from 
sociology and history of science, critical data studies, and early 
writing on knowledge discovery in databases—we describe the 
complex set of actors and activities involved in problem 
formulation. Our research demonstrates that the specification 
and operationalization of the problem are always negotiated 
and elastic, and rarely worked out with explicit normative 
considerations in mind. In so doing, we show that careful 
accounts of everyday data science work can help us better 
understand how and why data science problems are posed in 
certain ways—and why specific formulations prevail in 
practice, even in the face of what might seem like normatively 
preferable alternatives. We conclude by discussing the 
implications of our findings, arguing that effective normative 
interventions will require attending to the practical work of 
problem formulation. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Information systems → Data mining; • Computing 
methodologies → Machine learning; • Human-centered 
computing → Ethnographic studies 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Undertaking a data science1 project involves a series of 
difficult translations. As Provost and Fawcett point out, 
“[b]usiness problems rarely are classification problems, or 
regression problems or clustering problems” [38:293]. They 
must be made into questions that data science can answer. 
Practitioners are frequently charged with turning amorphous 
goals into well-specified problems—that is, problems faithful 
to the original business objectives, but also problems that can 
be addressed by predicting the value of a variable. Often, the 
outcome or quality that practitioners want to predict—the 
‘target variable’—is not one that has been well observed or 
measured in the past. In such cases, practitioners look to other 
variables that can act as suitable stand-ins—‘proxies’. 
This process is challenging and far from linear. As Hand 
argues, “establishing the mapping from the client’s domain to 
a statistical question is one of the most difficult parts of 
statistical analysis,” [22:317] and data scientists frequently 
devise ways of providing answers to problems that differ from 
those that seemed to motivate the analysis. In most normative 
assessments of data science, this work of translation drops out 
entirely, treating the critical task as one of interrogating 
properties of the resulting model. However, ethical concerns 
can extend to the formulation of the problem that a model 
aims to address, not merely to whether the model exhibits 
discriminatory effects. 
To aid in hiring decisions, for example, machine learning 
needs to predict a specific outcome or quality of interest. One 
might want to use machine learning to find “good” employees 
to hire, but the meaning of “good” is not self-evident. Machine 
learning requires specific and explicit definitions, demanding 
that those definitions refer to something measurable. While an 
employer might want to find personable applicants to join its 
1 The term ‘data science,’ as used in this paper, refers to the practice of 
assembling, organizing, processing, modeling, and analyzing data using 
computational and statistical techniques. In this paper, we focus specifically on 
supervised machine learning, but the analysis applies more broadly. 
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sales staff, such a quality can be difficult to specify or measure. 
What counts as personable? And how would employers 
measure it? Given the challenge of answering these questions, 
employers might favor a definition focused on sales figures, 
which they may find easier to monitor. In other words, they 
might define a “good” employee as the person with the highest 
predicted sales figures. In so doing, the problem of hiring is 
formulated as one of predicting applicants’ sales figures, not 
simply identifying “good” employees. 
As Barocas and Selbst [3] demonstrate, choosing among 
competing target variables can affect whether a model used in 
hiring decisions ultimately exhibits a disparate impact. There 
are three reasons why this might happen. First, the target 
variable might be correlated with protected characteristics. In 
other words, an employer might focus on a quality that is 
distributed unevenly across the population. This alone would 
not constitute illegal discrimination, as the quality upon which 
the employer hinges its hiring decisions could be rational and 
defensible. But, the employer could just as well choose a target 
variable that is a purposeful proxy for race, gender, or other 
protected characteristics. This would amount to a form of 
disparate treatment, but one that might be difficult to establish 
if the decision rests on a seemingly neutral target variable. The 
employer could also choose a target variable that seems to 
serve its rational business interests but happens to generate an 
avoidable disparate impact—for instance, the employer could 
choose a different target variable that serves its business 
objective at least as well as the original choice while also 
reducing the disparate impact. 
Second, the chosen target variable might be measured less 
accurately for certain groups. For example, arrests are often 
used as a proxy for crime in applications of machine learning 
to policing and criminal justice, even though arrests are a 
racially biased representation of the true incidence of crime 
[28]. In treating arrests as a reliable proxy for crime, the model 
learns to replicate the biased labels in its predictions. This is a 
particularly pernicious problem because the labeled examples 
in the training data serve as ground truth for the model. 
Specifically, the model will learn to assign labels to cases 
similar to those that received the label in the training data, 
whether or not the labels in the training data are accurate. 
Worse, evaluations of the model will likely rely on test data 
that were labeled using the same process, resulting in 
misleading reports about the model’s real-world performance: 
these metrics would reflect the model’s ability to predict the 
label, not the true outcome. Indeed, when the training and test 
data have been mislabeled in the same way, there is simply no 
way to know when the model is making mistakes. Choosing a 
target variable is therefore often a choice between outcomes 
of interest that are labeled more or less accurately. When these 
outcomes are systematically mismeasured by race, gender, or 
some other protected characteristic, a model designed to 
predict them will invariably exhibit a discriminatory bias that 
does not show up in performance metrics. 
Finally, different target variables might be more difficult to 
predict than others depending on the available training data 
and features. If the ability to predict the target variable varies 
by population, then the model might subject certain groups to 
greater errors than others. 
Across all three cases, we find that whether a model 
ultimately violates a specific notion of fairness is often 
contingent on what the model is designed to predict. Which 
suggests that we should be paying far greater attention to the 
choice of the target variable, both because it can be a source of 
unfairness and a mechanism to avoid unfairness. 
The non-obvious origins of obvious problems. This 
might not be surprising because some problem formulations 
may strike us as obviously unfair. Consider the case of 
‘financial-aid leveraging’ in college admissions—the process 
by which universities calculate the best possible return for 
financial aid packages: the brightest students for the least 
amount of financial aid. To achieve this bargain, the university 
must predict how much each student is willing to pay to attend 
the university and how much of a discount would sway an 
applicant from competitors. In economic terms, ‘financial-aid 
leveraging’ calculates each applicant’s responsiveness to price, 
which enables the university to make tailored offers that 
maximize the likely impact of financial aid on individual 
enrollment decisions. As Quirk [39] explains: “Take a $20,000 
scholarship—the full tuition for a needy student at some 
schools. Break it into four scholarships each for wealthier 
students who would probably go elsewhere without the 
discount but will pay the outstanding tuition if they can be 
lured to your school. Over four years the school will reap an 
extra $240,000, which can be used to buy more rich students—
or gifted students who will improve the school’s profile and 
thus its desirability and revenue.” Such strategies are in effect 
in schools throughout the United States, and the impact has 
been an increase in support for wealthier applicants at the 
expense of their equally qualified, but poorer peers [42,43]. 
One might, therefore, conclude, as Danielson [11:44] does, 
that “data mining technology increasingly structures 
recruiting to many U.S. colleges and universities,” and that the 
technology poses a threat to such important values as equality 
and meritocracy. Alternatively, one could find, like Cook [9] 
in a similar thought experiment, that “[t]he results would have 
been different if the goal were to find the most diverse student 
population that achieved a certain graduation rate after five 
years. In this case, the process was flawed fundamentally and 
ethically from the beginning.” For Cook, agency and ethics are 
front-loaded: a poorly formed question returns undesirable, if 
correct, answers. Data science might be the enabling device, 
but the ethical issue precedes the analysis and 
implementation. The objective was suspect from the start. For 
Danielson, however, certain ethics seem to flow from data 
mining itself. Data science is not merely the enabling device, 
but the impetus for posing certain questions. Its introduction 
affords new, and perhaps objectionable, ways of devising 
admissions strategies. 
Though they are quite different, these positions are not 
necessarily incompatible: data science might invite certain 
kinds of questions, and ‘financial-aid leveraging’ could be one 
such example. One might say that data science promotes the 
formulation of questions that would be better left unasked. 
PROBLEM FORMULATION AND FAIRNESS 
 
 
But, this is a strangely unhelpful synthesis: while according 
agency to the person or people who might formulate the 
problem, it simultaneously imparts overwhelming influence to 
the affordances of data science. The effort of getting the 
question to work as a data science problem drops out entirely, 
even though this process is where the question actually and 
ultimately takes shape. The issues of genuine concern—how 
universities arrive at a workable notion of student quality, 
how they decide on optimizing for competing variables 
(student quality, financial burden, diversity, etc.), how the 
results are put to work in one of many possible ways—are left 
largely out of view. The indeterminacy of the process, where 
many of the ethical issues are actually resolved, disappears. 
Problem formulation in practice. While a focus on the 
work of problem formulation in real-world applied settings 
has the potential to make visible the plethora of actors and 
activities involved in data science work, it has not been the 
focus of much empirical inquiry to date. We still know very 
little about the everyday practice of problem formulation. In 
this paper, we attempt to fill this gap. How and why are 
specific questions posed? What challenges arise and how are 
they resolved in everyday practice? How do actors’ choices 
and decisions shape data science problem formulations? 
Answers to these questions, we argue, can help us to better 
understand data science as a practice, but also the origin of the 
qualities of a data science project that raise normative 
concerns. As researchers work to unpack the normative values 
at stake in the uses of data science, we offer an ethnographic 
account of a special financing project for auto lending to make 
visible the work of problem formulation in applied contexts. 
In so doing, we show how to trace the ethical implications of 
these systems back to the everyday challenges and routine 
negotiations of data science. 
In the following sections, we first situate the paper in a 
longer history attending to the practical dimensions of data 
science, specifically the task of problem formulation. We then 
describe our research site and methodology, before moving to 
the empirical case-study. We conclude by discussing the 
implications of our findings, positioning the practical work of 
problem formulation as an important site for normative 
investigation and intervention. 
2 BACKGROUND 
Our understanding of the role of problem formulation in data 
science work draws from a long line of research within the 
history and sociology of science that describes how scientific 
methods are not just tools for answering questions, but in fact 
influence the kind of questions we ask and the ways in which 
we define and measure phenomena [8,25,27,37]. Through 
different methods, scientists “mathematize” [29,30] the world 
in specific ways, producing representations that are both 
contingent (i.e., they change with a change in methods) and 
real (i.e., they provide actionable ways to analyze the 
world). Our practical understanding of a given phenomenon 
is contingent on the data we choose to represent and measure 
it with. 
The emerging field of critical data studies has brought 
similar insights to data science: data scientists do not just 
apply algorithms to data, but work with algorithms and data—
iteratively and often painstakingly—aligning the two together 
in meaningful ways. Data science work, Passi and Jackson 
argue [35:2439], “is not merely a collection of formal and 
mechanical rules, but a situated and discretionary process 
requiring data analysts to continuously straddle the 
competing demands of formal abstraction and empirical 
contingency.” Algorithmic results embody specific forms of 
“data vision”—rule-based, as opposed to rule-bound, 
applications of algorithms, necessitating judgment-driven 
work “to apply and improvise around established methods and 
tools in the wake of empirical diversity” [35:2436]. 
Data science requires “thoughtful measurement, […] 
careful research design, […and] creative deployment of 
statistical techniques” [21:80] to identify units of 
measurement, clean and process data, construct working 
models, and interpret quantified results [4,5,19,32,34–36]. 
Subjective decision making is necessary throughout the 
process. Each of these practical choices can have profound 
ethical implications [10,13,24,31,40], of which data scientists 
are sometimes well aware. Their everyday work is shot 
through with “careful thinking and critical reflection” [1:23]. 
Neff et al. [33], through ethnographic work on academic data 
science research, show how data scientists often 
“acknowledge their interpretive contributions” and “use data 
to surface and negotiate social values.” Data, the authors 
argue, are the starting, and not the end, points in data science. 
In academic and research settings—the contexts that 
inform most of our current understanding of data science—the 
work of data science comes across mainly as the work of data 
scientists. Data science projects in applied corporate settings, 
however, are inherently collaborative endeavors—a world as 
much of discretion, collaboration, and aspiration as of data, 
numbers, and models. In such projects, several actors work 
together to not only make sense of data and algorithmic 
results but also to negotiate and resolve practical problems. 
Passi and Jackson [36:18–19], through an ethnography of a 
corporate data science team, describe how specific issues with 
data, intuition, metrics, and models pose challenges for 
corporate data science work, and how organizational actors 
collaborate, through specific strategies, to manage these 
problems “in the service of imperfect but ultimately pragmatic 
and workable forms of analysis.” As the authors conclude, 
“[p]roject managers, product designers, and business analysts 
are as much a part of applied real-world corporate data science 
as are data scientists” [36:16]. 
These strands of research call attention to the role of the 
work of problem formulation within data science. The 
relationship between formulated problems and the data we 
choose to address them is not a one-way street—data are not 
merely things to answer questions with. Instead, the very 
formulations of data-driven problems (i.e., the kind of 
questions we can and do ask) are determined by contingent 
aspects such as what data are available, what data we consider 
relevant to a phenomenon, and what method we choose to 
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process them. Problem formulation is as much an outcome of 
our data and methods as of our goals and objectives. Indeed, 
defining the data science problem is not only about making 
the data science process fit specific and specifiable objectives 
but also making the objectives fit the data science process. 
Data miners have long grappled with the role of human 
judgment and discretion in their practice. The field of 
Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD)—an important 
predecessor to what we now call data science—emerged to 
address how choices throughout the data mining process 
could be formalized in so-called process models. 
Knowledge Discovery in Databases 
The iterative process of applied data mining. While KDD 
is commonly associated with data mining and machine 
learning, the history of the field has less to do with innovations 
around these techniques than with the process that surrounds 
their use. Dissatisfied with a lack of applied research in 
artificial intelligence, scholars and practitioners founded the 
new sub-field to draw together experts in computer science, 
statistics, and data management who were interested and 
proficient in the practical applications of machine learning 
[see: 18]. The significance of this move owed to a shift in the 
field’s professional focus, not to a change in the substance of 
its computational techniques. When KDD established itself as 
an independent field, 2 it also instituted a method for applying 
machine learning to real-world problems—the KDD process, 
consisting of a set of computational techniques and specific 
procedures through which questions are transformed into 
tractable data mining problems [15,16]. Although the terms 
KDD and data mining are now used interchangeably—if they 
are used at all—the original difference between the two is 
telling. While data mining referred exclusively to the 
application of machine learning algorithms, KDD referred to 
the overall process of reworking questions into data-driven 
problems, collecting and preparing relevant data, subjecting 
data to analysis, and interpreting and implementing results. 
The canon of KDD devoted extensive attention not only to the 
range of problems that lend themselves to machine learning 
but also to the multi-step process by which these problems can 
be made into practicable instances of machine learning. In 
their seminal paper, Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro, and Smyth, for 
example, insist on the obvious applicability of data mining 
while paradoxically attempting to explain and advocate how 
to apply it in practice—that is, how to make it applicable [14]. 
KDD covered more than just a set of computational 
techniques; it amounted to a method for innovating and 
executing new applications. 
The focus on process led to the development of a series of 
process models—formal attempts to explicate how one 
progresses through a data mining project, breaking the 
process into discrete steps [26]. The Cross Industry Standard 
Process for Data Mining (CRISP-DM) [7], the most widely 
adopted model, seems to simultaneously describe and 
prescribe the relevant steps in a project’s lifecycle. Such an 
                                                             
2 Semi-annual workshops started in 1989. Annual conferences began in 1995. 
approach grows directly out of the earliest KDD writing. 
Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro, and Smyth [14] make a point of 
saying that “data mining is a legitimate activity as long as one 
understands how to do it,” suggesting that there is a particular 
way to go about mining data to ensure appropriate results. 
Indeed, the main impetus for developing process models were 
fears of mistakes, missteps, and misapplications, rather than a 
simple desire to explicate what it is that data miners do. As 
Kurgan and Musilek [26] explain, the push “to formally 
structure [data mining] as a process results from an 
observation of problems associated with a blind application of 
[data mining] methods to input data.” Notably, CRISP-DM, 
like the earlier models that preceded it in the academic 
literature [14–16], emphasized the iterative nature of the 
process and the need to move back and forth between steps. 
The attention to feedback loops and the overall dynamism of 
the process were made especially evident in the widely 
reproduced visual rendering of the process that adopted a 
circular form to stress cyclicality [26]. 
Negotiated, not faithful, translations. Business 
understanding, the first step in the CRISP-DM model, is 
perhaps the most crucial in a data mining project because it 
involves the translation of an amorphous problem (a high-
level objective or a business goal) into a question amenable to 
data mining. CRISP-DM describes this step as the process of 
“understanding the project objectives and requirements from 
a business perspective [and] then converting this knowledge 
into a data mining problem definition” [7:10]. This process of 
‘conversion,’ however, is underspecified in the extreme. 
Translating complex objectives into a data mining problem is 
not self-evident: “a large portion of the application effort can 
go into properly formulating the problem (asking the right 
question) rather than into optimizing the algorithmic details 
of a particular data-mining method” [14:46]. Indeed, the open-
endedness that characterizes such forms of translation work is 
often described as the ‘art’ of data mining [12]. Recourse to 
such terms reveals the degree to which the creativity of the 
translation process resists its own translation into still more 
specific parts and processes (i.e., it is artistic only insofar as it 
resists formalization). But it also highlights the importance of 
this initial task in determining the very possibility of mining 
data for some purpose. 
CRISP-DM and other practical guidance for data miners or 
data scientists [see: 6,26] tend to describe problem formulation 
mainly as part of a project’s first phase—an initial occasion 
for frank conversations between the managers who set 
strategic business goals, the technologists that manage an 
organization’s data, and the analysts that ultimately work on 
data. Predictably, those involved in data science work face the 
difficult challenge of faithful translation—finding the 
correct mapping between, say, corporate goals, organizational 
data, and computational problems. Practitioners themselves 
have long recognized that even when project members reach 
consensus in formulating the problem, it is a negotiated 
translation—contingent on the discretionary judgments of 
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various actors and further impacted by the choice of methods, 
instruments, and data. 
These insights speak to the conditions that motivate data 
science projects in a way that escapes the kind of technological 
determinism or data imperative that pervades the current 
discourses—as if the kinds of questions that data science can 
answer are always already evident. Getting the automation of 
machine learning to return the desired results paradoxically 
involves an enormous amount of manual work and subjective 
judgment [3]. The work of problem formulation—of iteratively 
translating between strategic goals and tractable problems—is 
anything but self-evident, implicated with several practical 
and organizational aspects of data science work. As Hand 
points out, “[t]extbook descriptions of data mining tools […] 
and articles extolling the potential gains to be achieved by 
applying data mining techniques gloss over [these] 
difficulties” [23:8]. 
In the following two sections, we look at the work of data 
science that is traditionally glossed over. We first describe our 
research site and methods before moving on to the empirical 
case-study through which we show how the initial problem 
formulation comprises a series of elastic translations—a set of 
placeholder articulations that is susceptible to change as the 
project moves through its many iterations. 
3 RESEARCH SITE AND METHODS 
This paper builds on six months of ethnographic fieldwork 
with DataVector3, a multi-billion-dollar US-based e-commerce 
and new media organization. Established in the 1990s, 
DataVector owns several companies in domains such as health 
and automotive. Many of these are multi-million-dollar 
companies with several thousand clients each. DataVector has 
a core data science team based on the west coast of the United 
States that works with companies across different domains. 
There are multiple teams of data engineers, software 
developers, and business analysts, both at DataVector and its 
subsidiaries. One of us worked as a data scientist with the 
organization’s core data science team between June and 
November 2017, serving as the lead scientist on two corporate 
data science projects (not reported in this paper) and 
participating in many others. During ethnographic research, 
the data science team had eight to eleven members (including 
one of the authors). The team is headed by Cliff—DataVector’s 
Director of Data Science with 30+ years of industry experience 
in major technology firms. Cliff and the team report directly 
to Bill—DataVector’s Chief Technology Officer with 20+ years 
of experience in the technology industry. 
During the six-month period, one of us conducted 50+ 
interviews with data scientists, product managers, business 
analysts, project managers, and company executives and 
produced 400+ pages of fieldwork notes and 100+ 
photographs. Interviews and fieldwork data were transcribed 
and coded according to the principles of grounded-theory 
analysis [20,41], inductively analyzing data through several 
                                                             
3 Organization, personnel, and project names in this paper have been replaced 
with pseudonyms to preserve participant anonymity. 
rounds of qualitative analysis.  In our analysis, we coded the 
data in two rounds, focusing on the identification of key 
categories, themes, and topics as well as the relation between 
them in the data. While we focus on a specific corporate data 
science project in this paper, we observed similar dynamics 
across several other projects. We chose this case because the 
work of problem formulation was particularly salient in this 
project. 
4 CASE-STUDY: SPECIAL FINANCING 
CarCorp, a DataVector subsidiary, collects special financing 
data: information on people who need car financing but have 
either low/bad credit scores (between 300-600) or limited 
credit histories. The company’s clientele mainly consists of 
auto dealers who pay to receive this data (called lead data) 
that include information such as name, address, mortgage, and 
employment details (sometimes even the make of the desired 
automobile). The company collects lead data primarily online: 
people who need special financing submit their data so that 
interested dealers can contact them. People requiring special 
financing face several challenges ranging from the lack of 
knowledge about available credit sources to difficulties in 
negotiating interest rates. As liaisons between borrowers and 
lenders, companies such as CarCorp and its affiliates act as 
important, sometimes necessary, intermediaries for people 
requiring special financing. CarCorp serves several dealers 
across the country.4 Few dealers collect their own lead data as 
the money, effort, and technical skills required to do so is 
enormous. This is a key reason why dealers pay companies 
such as CarCorp to buy lead data. 
CarCorp’s technology development and project manager 
Brian wanted to leverage data science to “improve the quality” 
of leads. Improving lead quality, Brian argued, will ensure that 
existing dealers do not churn (i.e., they continue to give their 
business to CarCorp). 
Brian (project manager): “The main goal [is] to improve 
the quality of our leads for our customers. We want to give 
actionable leads. […] That is what helps us make money, 
makes customers continue to use our services” (Interview, 
November 1, 2017). 
Initial discussions between the business and data science 
teams revolved around two themes: (a) defining lead “quality” 
and (b) finding ways to measure it. Defining lead quality was 
not straightforward. There were “many stakeholders with 
different opinions about leads” (ibid.). Some described lead 
quality as a function of a lead’s salary data, while some argued 
that a lead was good if the dealer had the lead’s desired car in 
their inventory. Everyone on the business team, however, 
agreed on one thing—as CarCorp’s business analyst Ron put 
it: a “good” lead provided business to the dealer. 
Ron (business analyst): “The business team has been 
talking about [lead quality] for a long time. […] We have 
narrowed down the lead quality problem to how likely is 
someone to purchase or to be able to finance a car when 
4 The exact number is omitted to preserve company anonymity. 
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you send them to that dealer?” (Interview, November 8, 
2017). 
Lead “quality” was equated with lead “financeability.” It was, 
however, difficult to ascertain financeability. Different dealers 
had different special financing approval processes. A lead 
financeable for one dealer can be, for various reasons, 
unfinanceable for another. The goal thus was to determine 
dealer-specific financeability (i.e., predicting which dealer 
was most likely to finance a lead). The teams settled on the 
following definition of “quality”: a good lead for a dealer was 
a lead financeable for that dealer. This, in turn, framed the 
problem as one of matching leads to dealers that were most 
likely to finance them. 
CarCorp had a large amount of historical lead data. In 2017 
alone, the company had processed close to two million leads. 
CarCorp, however, had relatively less data on which leads had 
been approved for special financing (let alone data on why a 
lead was approved). The business team asked the data science 
team to contact data engineers to identify and assess the 
relevant data sources. The data science team, after 
investigating the data sources, however, declared that there 
wasn’t enough data on dealer decisions—without adequate 
data, they argued, it was impossible to match leads with 
dealers. Few dealers in CarCorp’s network shared their 
approval data with the company. The scarcity of this data 
stemmed from the challenge of creating business incentives 
for dealers to provide up-to-date feedback. The incentives for 
dealers to share information about their approval process with 
CarCorp were too attenuated. 
While the data science team instructed the business team 
to invest in the collection of up-to-date data on dealer 
decisions, further discussions ensued between the two teams 
to find alternate ways to predict dealer-specific financeability 
using the data that happened to be available already. In 
debates over the utility of the available data, business analysts 
and data scientists, however, voiced several concerns ranging 
from inconsistency (e.g., discrepancies in data values) to 
unreliability (e.g., distrust of data sources). Business analyst 
Ron, for instance, was wary of the multiple ways in which the 
data was collected and generated: 
Ron (business analyst): “The entire complex lead 
ecosystem […] to outsiders does not make any sense. 
[…Some data] came from an affiliate. […] They give a credit 
score range for a bunch of those leads. So, not exactly the 
score, but they could say ‘this person is between 450-475, 
and 525-550,’ different buckets. [...] Never realistic, but we 
pay money, and we have this data. [...] We [also] generate 
leads organically [online], then there are leads that we [buy 
from third-parties]. […] Different pieces of information 
[are] appended to those leads depending on where it came 
from” (Interview, November 8, 2017). 
Only a few CarCorp affiliates augmented lead data with 
additional information such as credit scores. Dealers run 
background checks on leads (with their consent) as part of the 
financing procedure and in the process get a lead’s exact credit 
                                                             
5 Third-party lending agencies offer services to help put borrowers in touch with 
multiple lenders. These agencies get consent from people to perform a soft-pull 
on their official credit reports from credit bureaus such as Equifax. 
score from credit bureaus such as Equifax. The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA) prohibits CarCorp from getting a lead’s 
exact credit score from credit bureaus without a lead’s explicit 
consent. Leads have no reason to authorize CarCorp to 
retrieve their credit data because the company does not make 
lending decisions; it only collects information about a lead’s 
interest in special financing. CarCorp had to rely on either 
leads’ self-reported credit scores that were collected by a few 
affiliates or on credit scores provided as part of lead data 
bought from third-party lending agencies.5 Business affiliates 
and third-party agencies provide credit scores in the form of 
an approximate range (e.g., 476-525). CarCorp had hoped that 
this data would help them to, for example, differentiate 
between a subset of leads that appeared identical but exhibited 
different financeability. 
Ron (business analyst): “Two individuals [with] the 
same age, same income, same housing payment, same 
everything […] could have wildly different credit scores. 
[...] You have those two, and you send them to the same 
dealer. From our perspective, lead A and B are […] maybe 
not exactly [the] same, but close. [...] But, the dealer can 
finance person A, and they cannot finance person B [...] So, 
when they [dealers] are evaluating […] whether they 
would renew their product with us, if we had sent them a 
bunch from bucket B, and none from A, they are likely to 
churn. But, we have no way of knowing who is in bucket 
A and who is in bucket B. […] You can have two individuals 
who measure the same on data points, and they have two 
different credit scores.” (Interview, November 8, 2017). 
It is not surprising that a lead with a credit score greater than 
another lead is more likely to secure special financing (even 
when the leads are otherwise identical). Credit score data is a 
significant factor in special financing approval processes. 
CarCorp had this data for about ~10% of their leads (~100,000). 
While business analysts found it challenging to predict credit 
score ranges from the other features using traditional 
statistical analyses, adding credit score ranges in as an 
additional feature did improve the company’s ability to predict 
lead financeability. The business team wondered if it was 
possible to use data science to predict credit score ranges for 
the remaining 90% of the leads (i.e., perhaps machine learning 
could work where traditional analysis had failed). If successful, 
credit scores could help ascertain lead financeability—a 
financeable lead was a lead with a high credit score. 
The data science team’s attempt to assess if they could 
predict credit scores, however, faced a practical challenge. As 
mentioned above, credit score data received from affiliates 
took the form of ranges (e.g., 476-525), not discrete numbers. 
Different affiliates marked ranges differently. For example, 
one affiliate may categorize ranges as 476-525, 526-575, etc., 
while another as 451-500, 501-550, etc. It was not possible to 
directly use the ranges as class labels for training as the ranges 
overlapped. The data science team first needed to reconcile 
different ranges. 
As data scientist Alex started working to make the ranges 
consistent, business analysts came up with a way to make this 
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process easier. Pre-existing market analysis (and, to some 
extent, word-of-mouth business wisdom) indicated that 
having a credit score higher than 500 greatly increased a lead’s 
likelihood of obtaining special financing approval. This piece 
of information had a significant impact on the project. With 
500 as the crucial threshold, only two credit score ranges were 
now significant: below-500 and above-500. Alex did not need 
to figure out ways to reconcile ranges such as 376-425 and 401-
450 but could bundle them in the below-500 category. The 
above-500 credit score range could act as the measure of 
financeability—a financeable lead was a lead with a credit 
score above-500. The matching problem (which leads are 
likely to get financed by a dealer) was now a classification 
task (which leads have a credit score of over 500). 
Decreasing the number of classes to two helped attenuate the 
difficulty of reconciling different ranges but did not help to 
circumvent it. 
Alex (data scientist): If the credit score is below 500, the 
dealer will simply kill the deal. […] The problem is there 
are too many records in the 476-525 range. […] This makes 
it difficult (Fieldwork Notes, June 13, 2017). 
Leads in the 476-525 range were an issue because this range 
contained not only below-500 leads, but also above-500 leads. 
Making mistakes close to the decision boundary is especially 
consequential for special financing where you want to find 
people just above the threshold. Alex tried many ways to 
segregate the leads in this range but the models, according to 
him, didn’t work. Their accuracy, at best, was slightly better 
than a coin flip. Alex attributed the model’s bad performance 
not only to the presence of leads in the 476-525 range, but also 
to the limited number of available features (i.e., the data did 
not present sufficient information for the model to 
meaningfully differentiate between leads). While the in-house 
lead dataset was a good starting point, the data scientists knew 
that accurately classifying leads would require not only 
creative ways to work with available data, but also a wide 
variety of data. They had already been scouting for external 
datasets to augment the in-house lead dataset. 
Director of data science Cliff had tasked data science 
project manager Marcus with the work of finding third-party 
datasets that could help with classification. Their approach 
was first to use freely available data to see “how far we get” 
before buying paid data from companies such as Experian.6 
Free, yet reliable, datasets, however, were hard to come by. 
Marcus found only a few datasets—Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) zip-code-level data on features such as income range, tax 
returns, and house affordability (i.e., how much an owner 
might be able to pay for a property). Data scientist Alex tried 
each dataset but declared that none improved model 
performance. Members of the data science team wondered if it 
was worth investing in high-quality paid datasets. 
Alex: I used all the data, but the model does not converge. 
Marcus: What about Experian data? We can get it if you 
think it will help. 
                                                             
6 For example, datasets such as Experian’s Premier Aggregated Credit Statistics 
(http://www.experian.com/consumer-information/premier-aggregated-credit-
Alex: We will have to buy it first for me to know if it helps 
with prediction. 
Cliff (director of data science): Check out the online info 
on it, and then you and Marcus can figure it out (Fieldwork 
Notes, June 16, 2017). 
Without access to the data, Alex argued, it was not possible to 
clearly know its usefulness. If the data was not going to be 
helpful, however, it made no sense to buy it—the decision 
needed to be made based on the available description on 
Experian’s website. They eventually ended up not investing in 
it. Even after analyzing the dataset’s description, Alex was not 
convinced that the data would increase model performance. 
Two months later, the project was halted in the absence of 
actionable progress. 
Different actors justified the project’s seeming failure in 
different ways. Data scientist Alex felt that the data was the 
culprit. Business analyst Ron felt that perhaps the business 
team unreasonably expected “magic” from data science. For 
him, the culprit was the nature of the problem itself: 
Ron (business analyst): “[It is a] selection-bias problem. 
We are not dealing with a random sample of the 
population. […] These individuals [...] why are they 
submitting a lead with us? Because it was not easy for them 
to get financed. By definition, our population is people 
with at least not great credit, and usually bad credit. Why 
do you have bad credit? There is like one reason why you 
have good credit. There are a thousand reasons why you 
have […] bad credit. [...] If you show me someone with 
good credit, I will show you they pay bills on time, have a 
steady income, etc. If you show me someone with bad 
credit, they can have a gambling problem, they can be 
divorced, they could […] prove income now, but maybe it 
has been unstable in the past, and we have no way of 
knowing that. There are literally thousands of reasons that 
aren’t that capture-able” (Interview, November 8, 2017). 
Business analyst Ron described the failure not in terms of the 
initially articulated business goal but in terms of the project’s 
current data science problem formulation—not the difficulty 
of defining the quality of a lead, but the challenge of 
classifying leads with scores in a specific part of the credit 
score spectrum. He believed it was possible to classify people 
with high/low credit scores on the full 300-850 credit score 
spectrum (e.g., differentiating between a person with a 750 
score and a person with a 450 score). He argued, however, that 
CarCorp’s focus on the special financing population meant 
that the goal was not to classify high/low scores on the full 
credit spectrum but to demarcate between different kinds of 
low scores on one side of the spectrum (roughly between 300 
and 600). Note how Ron, a business analyst, describes the 
project’s failure in relation to a specific definition of lead 
“quality”—it was difficult to know which leads were above or 
below the credit score threshold of 500. The project was halted 
when developing an accurate model based on this definition 
proved impossible. The business and data science team could 
not figure out any other way to formulate the problem at this 
stage with the data they had. 
statistics.html). Even such data only contained aggregated information on credit 
scores and ranges, and not lead-specific credit scores (which required consent). 
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5 DISCUSSION 
Through the above description, we see how the data science 
problem was formulated differently at different points in the 
project based on two different sets of targets variables and 
their possible proxies. 
Proxy #1: Dealer Decisions. The business team initially 
described the project goal as the improvement of lead 
quality—a formulation of what the business team thought the 
dealers wanted. Note that this goal was in turn related to the 
broader objective of minimizing churn rate—a formulation 
of what CarCorp itself wanted. In this way, the problem 
specification was just as much about keeping clients as it was 
about satisfying their business objectives. These high-level 
goals impacted the actors’ initial understanding of the 
project’s goal—the quality of leads was seen in relation to 
dealers and CarCorp’s own success. CarCorp decided that if 
dealers could finance a lead, it was a good lead. The fact that 
different dealers had different special financing approval 
processes further impacted the contingent relationship 
between quality, dealers, and financeability: if a lead was 
financeable by a specific dealer, it was a good lead for that 
dealer. The data science problem, therefore, became the task 
of matching leads with dealers that were likely to finance 
them. 
Proxy #2: Credit Score Ranges. Data available to support 
the use of dealer decisions as a proxy, however, were limited. 
While business analysts did not fully understand how dealers 
made decisions, they acknowledged, based on market 
research, the import of credit scores in the special financing 
approval process—leads with scores higher than 500 were 
highly likely to get special financing. Credit scores thus 
became a proxy for a dealer’s decision, which was itself a 
proxy for a lead’s financeability, which was, by extension, a 
proxy for a lead’s quality—indeed, a chain of proxies. The data 
science problem thus became the task of classifying leads into 
below- and above-500 classes. 
Problem formulation is a negotiated translation. At 
face value, the relationship between the project’s high-level 
business goal (improving lead quality) and its two different 
problem formulations (the two sets of target variables and 
their proxies) may seem like a one-to-many relation—different 
translations of, in effect, the same goal. Such an 
understanding, however, fails to account not only for the 
amorphous nature of high-level goals (i.e., the difficulty of 
defining the quality of a lead), but also for the project’s 
iterative and evolving nature (i.e., problem formulations are 
negotiated, dependent on, for instance, actors’ choice of 
proxy). In our case, actors equated (in order): lead quality with 
financeability, financeability with dealer decisions, and dealer 
decisions with credit score ranges. Each of these maneuvers 
produced different formulations of the objective, in turn 
impacting actors’ articulation and understanding of the 
project’s high-level goal (as seen, for instance, in the way 
business analyst Ron ultimately accounts for the project’s 
failure). 
                                                             
7 Of course, depending on the threshold, some leads will never be sent. 
This is not to argue that the high-level goal to improve lead 
quality, at some point, transformed into a completely 
different objective. Instead, it shows that the translation 
between high-level goals and tractable data science problems 
is not a given but a negotiated outcome—stable yet elastic. 
Throughout the project, the goal of improving lead quality 
remains recognizably similar but practically different, 
evident in the different descriptions, target variables, and 
proxies for lead quality. Each set of target variables and 
proxies represents a specific understanding of what a lead’s 
quality is and what it means to improve on it. The quality of a 
lead is not a preexisting variable waiting to be measured, but 
an artifact of how our actors define and measure it. 
The values at stake in problem formulation. Scholars 
concerned with bias in computer systems have long stressed 
the need to consider the original objectives or goals that 
motivate a project, apart from any form of bias that may creep 
into the system during its development and implementation 
[17]. On this account, the apparent problem to which data 
science is a solution determines whether it happens to serve 
morally defensible ends. Information systems can be no less 
biased than the objectives they serve. 
These goals, however, rarely emerge ready-formed or 
precisely specified. Instead, navigating the vagaries of the data 
science process requires reconceiving the problem at hand and 
making it one that data and algorithms can help solve. In our 
empirical case, we do not observe a data science project 
working in the service of an established goal, about which 
there might be some normative debate. Instead, we find that 
the normative implications of the project evolve alongside 
changes in the different problem formulations of lead quality. 
On the one hand, for the proxy of dealer-decisions, leads 
are categorized by their dealer-specific financeability—a lead 
is only sent to the dealer that is likely to finance them. In 
formulating the problem as a matching task, the company is 
essentially catering to dealer preferences. This approach will 
recommend leads to dealers that align with the preferences 
expressed in dealers’ previous decisions. In this case, lead 
financeability operates on a spectrum. Financeability emerges 
as a more/less attribute: each lead is financeable, some more 
than others depending on the dealer. Effectively, each lead has 
at least a chance of being sent to a dealer (i.e., the dealer with 
the highest probability of financing a lead above some 
threshold).7 
On the other hand, for the credit-score proxy, leads are 
categorized into two classes based on their credit score ranges 
and only leads with scores greater than 500 are considered 
financeable. In formulating the problem as the task of 
classifying leads above or below a score, the company reifies 
credit scores as the sole marker for financeability. Even if 
dealers had in the past financed leads with credit scores less 
than 500, this approach only recommends leads with scores 
higher than 500, shaping dealers’ future financing practices. In 
this approach, financeability operates as a binary variable: a 
lead is financeable only if its credit score is higher than 500. 
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Consequently, leads in the below-500 category may never see 
the light of day, discounted entirely because the company 
believes that these leads are not suitable for dealers. 
Different principles; different normative concerns. 
Seen this way, the matching version of the problem 
formulation may appear normatively preferable to the 
classification version. But, is this always true? If we prioritize 
maximizing a person’s lending opportunities, the matching 
formulation of the problem may seem better because it 
increases a lead’s chances of securing special financing. If, 
however, we prioritize the goal of mitigating existing biases in 
lending practices (i.e., of alleviating existing dealer biases), the 
classification problem formulation may come across as the 
better alternative because it potentially encourages dealers to 
consider leads different from those they have financed in the 
past. Through the two scenarios, we see how proxies are not 
merely ways to equate goals with data but serve to frame the 
problem in subtly different ways—and raise different ethical 
concerns as a result. 
It is far from obvious which of the two concerns is more 
serious and thus which choice is normatively preferable—
shifting our normative lens alters our perception of fairness 
concerning the choice of target variables and proxies. In this 
paper, we have demonstrated how approaching the work of 
problem formulation as an important site for investigation 
enables us to have a much more careful discussion about our 
own normative commitments. This, in turn, provides insights 
into how we can ensure that projects align with those 
commitments. 
Always imperfect; always partial. Translating strategic 
goals into tractable problems is a labored and challenging 
process. Such translations do necessary violence to the world 
that they attempt to model, but also provide actionable and 
novel ways to address complex problems. Our intention to 
make visible the elasticity and multiplicity of such translations 
was thus not to criticize actors’ inability to find the perfectly 
faithful translation. Quite the opposite: we recognize that 
translations are always imperfect and partial, and wanted to 
instead shift the attention to the consequences of different 
translations and the everyday judgments that drive them. 
Our actors, however, did not explicitly debate the ethical 
implications of their own systems—neither in the way we, as 
researchers, have come to recognize normative issues, nor in 
the way we, as authors, have analyzed the implications of their 
problem formulations in this paper. Practical and 
organizational aspects such as business requirements, the 
choice of proxies, the nature of the algorithmic task, and the 
availability of data impact problem formulations in much 
more significant and actionable ways than, for instance, the 
practitioners’ normative commitments and beliefs. Indeed, our 
analysis of the empirical case makes visible how aspects such 
as analytic uncertainty and financial cost impact problem 
formulations. For example, the high cost of datasets coupled 
with the challenge of assessing the data’s efficacy without 
using it made it particularly challenging for actors to leverage 
additional sources of information. 
Yet, as we show in this paper, normative implications of 
data science systems do in fact find their roots in problem 
formulation work—the discretionary judgments and practical 
work involved in translations between high-level goals and 
tractable problems. Each translation galvanizes a different set 
of actors, aspirations, and practices, and, in doing so, creates 
opportunities and challenges for normative intervention—
upstream sites for downstream change. As Barocas et al. [2:6] 
argue: 
“A robust understanding of the ethical use of data-driven 
systems needs substantial focus on the possible threats to 
civil rights that may result from the formulation of the 
problem. Such threats are insidious, because problem 
formulation is iterative. Many decisions are made early and 
quickly, before there is any notion that the effort will lead 
to a successful system, and only rarely are prior problem-
formulation decisions revisited with a critical eye.” 
If we wish to take seriously the work of unpacking the 
normative implications of data science systems and of 
intervening in their development to ensure greater fairness, 
we need to find ways to identify, address, and accommodate 
the iterative and less visible work of formulating data science 
problems—how and why problems are formulated in specific 
ways. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we focused on the uncertain process by which 
certain questions come to be posed in real-world applied data 
science projects. We have shown that some of the most 
important normative implications of data science systems find 
their roots in the work of problem formulation. The attempt 
to make certain goals amenable to data science will always 
involve subtle transformations of those objectives along the 
way—transformations that may have profound consequences 
for the very conception of the problem to which data science 
has been brought to bear—and what consequently appear to 
be the most appropriate ways of handling those problems. 
Thus, the problems we solve with data science are never 
insulated from the larger process of getting data science to 
return actionable results. As we have shown, these ends are 
very much an artifact of a contingent process of arriving at a 
successful formulation of the problem, and they cannot be 
easily decoupled from the process at arriving at these ends. In 
linking the normative concerns that data science has provoked 
to more nuanced accounts of the on-the-ground process of 
undertaking a data science project, we have suggested new 
objects for investigation and intervention: which goals are 
posed and why; how goals are made into tractable 
questions and working problems; and, how and why 
certain problem formulations succeed.  
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